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Abstract: The complex relationship between international and municipal law has been the bone of significant scholarly 
contention. In the Indian context, despite a formal commitment to dualism, courts have effected an interpretive shift towards 
monism by espousing incorporation of international law. The case of Mohammad Salimullah v. Union of India, which involves the 
issue of deportation of Rohingya refugees from India, represents a challenge in this regard owing to the lack of clarity as to 
India‟s obligations under the principle of non-refoulement. The paper uses the Supreme Court‟s recent interim order in the said 
case as a case study to examine India‟s engagement with international law. It argues that the order inadequately examines the 
role of international law in constitutional interpretation and has the unfortunate effect of „refouling‟ Rohingyas by sending them 
back to a state where they face imminent persecution.    
  





The historical divergence amongst jurists on the question of the relationship 
between international and municipal law led to the emergence of two rival theories, 
namely, monism and dualism. As per the dualist view, international law does not 
transform into municipal law until and unless the former is adopted as valid law through 
the regular mode of lawmaking by the state (Ratnapala 2013, 93). On the other hand, 
monism views international law as being automatically incorporated into the domestic 
legal order, with there being no need for additional authorization by the state (Chandra 
2017, 27). In the modern context, these theories are regarded as unsatisfactory. 
(Bogdandy 2008,  400). Rather, “[i]t is actual practice, illustrated by custom and by treaty, 
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that formulates the role of international law, and not formalistic structures, theoretical 
deductions or moral stipulations” (Shaw 2017, 97). The role of international law within 
the municipal legal system is significantly more complicated than that of municipal law 
in the international sphere (Shaw 2017, 103). For instance, to what extent, if at all, should 
domestic courts place reliance on international law to interpret the constitution? 
Regrettably, the role of international law in the realm of Indian constitutional 
interpretation is “understudied and under-theorized” (Gautam 2019, 29). The 
Constitution of India refers to the state‟s engagement with international law “only in the 
vaguest terms” (Shaw 2017, 130). Whilst India‟s apex court has formally proclaimed India 
to be a dualist country, there is a significant divide between theory and practice 
(Chandra 2017, 44). Thus, the role of international law in domestic constitutional 
adjudication remains a contested domain. 
The case of Mohammad Salimullah v. Union of India (2017) (hereinafter: Mohd. 
Salimullah) poses some interesting doctrinal and methodological questions in this 
regard (Gautam 2019, 32). Mohd. Salimullah is a public interest litigation filed before the 
Supreme Court of India (hereinafter: the Court) seeking to prevent the deportation of 
40,000 Rohingya refugees in India. Whilst the principal plea remains pending, the Court 
passed an interim order, on 8 April 2021, allowing the deportation of Rohingya refugees 
back to Myanmar so long as “the procedure prescribed for such deportation is followed” 
(Mohd. Salimullah v. Union of India-Interim Order 2021). This case raised the issue of 
whether the principle of non-refoulement, which essentially entails that “no refugee 
should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution, other ill-
treatment or torture” (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 201), can be read into the 
provisions of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. Thus, it presents an 
opportunity to investigate the Court‟s application of international law in domestic 
constitutional adjudication. To that end, Part 2 of the paper provides a conspectus of the 
Court‟s jurisprudence concerning the use of international law for constitutional 
interpretation. Part 3 delves into the principle of non-refoulment and situates it within 
the international and domestic legal framework. Part 4 embarks on an analysis of the 
recent interim order in Mohd. Salimullah. Part 5 concludes with remarks about the legal 
status of the principle of non-refoulment in India and its larger implications for India‟s 
engagement with international law.  
 
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA‟S USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN  
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
The Constitution of India does not delineate the relationship of municipal law in 
the state with international law (Chandra 2017, 30). Primarily, Articles 51, 246, and 253 of 
the Constitution of India outline its engagement with international law (Hegde 2013, 70). 
Article 51 (c) enjoins the state to “foster respect for international law and treaty 
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obligations”. However, Article 51 (c) is one of the Directive Principles of State Policy, 
which whilst “fundamental in the governance of the country” (Constitution of India, 
Article 37), is non-justiciable and merely cast a duty on the State to apply them in the 
process of lawmaking. Thus, the fulfillment of the mandate of Article 51 (c) rests 
squarely on implementation through legislation (Hegde 2013, 68). Under Article 246, the 
distribution of legislative power between Parliament and the state legislatures is 
specified through three lists including the Union List, which falls within the sole purview 
of Parliament. Entry 14 in the Union List deals with entering into treaties and 
agreements with foreign countries and implementation of such treaties, conventions, 
and agreements. Article 253 of the Constitution provides for such implementation by 
endowing Parliament with the power to make laws for the whole or any part of India for 
the implementation of any treaty, agreement, or convention as well as decisions made 
at international conferences, associations, or other bodies whereas Article 73 of the 
Constitution provides that “the powers of the Union Executive are co-terminus with 
those of Parliament” (Chandra 2017, 32). A joint reading of Articles 253 and 73 of the 
Constitution recognizes treaty-making as an executive function (Hegde 2013, 70). That 
said, a treaty entered into by the executive does not transform into municipal law and 
cannot be implemented unless Parliament enacts a law under Article 253 (State of West 
Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. 2005). Therefore, from a textual perspective, treaty law 
is not applicable in India in the absence of appropriate domestic legislation to that 
effect (Chandra 2017, 33). However, in actual practice, the constitutional courts have 
incorporated and internalized several norms of international law (Rajamani 2016, 145). It 
has been argued that, over the years, the Court has effected a shift from „transformation‟ 
towards „incorporation‟, i.e. from a dualist to a monist position (Chandra 2017, 40). 
In the case of In Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves (1960), the Court 
held that the treaty-making power of the executive must be exercised by what the 
Constitution contemplates and subject to the limitations imposed by it. Subsequently, in 
MaganbhaiIshwarbhai Patel v. Union of India (1970), the Court noted that legislation 
giving effect to treaty obligations is necessitated in cases where the treaty operates to 
restrict justiciable rights or modifies municipal law. The Court adhered to this 
“transformation doctrine framework” until its judgment in Gramophone Company of 
India v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey (1984) (Gramophone Company), wherein it recognized 
the doctrine of incorporation by holding that the rules of international law are 
incorporated into the domestic legal framework unless they conflict with an Act of 
Parliament (Hegde 2013, 72). Thus, owing to Gramophone Company, “[i]nternational law 
move[d] from being inapplicable unless legislatively internalized to being applicable 
unless legislatively resisted” (Chandra 2017, 41). Subsequently, in Vishaka v. State of 
Rajasthan (1997), it was held that international conventions and norms are to be read 
into the provisions of fundamental rights of the Constitution of India, in case of a void in 
the domestic legal framework, provided there is no inconsistency between them.  
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This judgment forms part of a larger trend in common law jurisdictions, referred 
to as „creeping monism‟, whereby judges utilize unincorporated human rights treaties to 
interpret domestic law (Rajamani 2016, 148). Subsequently, in Shatrughan Chauhan v. 
Union of India (2014), the Court relied on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and held 
that international covenants to which India is a party form a part of the domestic legal 
framework unless they conflict with a specific law in force. Concerning customary 
international law, in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996), the Court 
held that once a principle is accepted as being a part of customary international law, 
there would be no difficulty in accepting the same as a part of municipal law. Thus, 
despite categorically stating that “India follows the doctrine of dualism and not monism” 
in Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra (2009), the Court has displayed a shift 
from dualism to monism (Chandra 2017, 44). 
 
NON-REFOULMENT AND INDIA 
 
The principle of non-refoulement finds articulation in Article 33 of the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 (hereinafter: the Refugee 
Convention, 1951). Vide Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, 1951, Article 33 applied 
only to individuals affected by events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951. 
Subsequently, Article 1 of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967 
(hereinafter: the Refugee Protocol, 1967) abolished these temporal and geographical 
limitations for almost all signatory states (Hathaway 2005, 97). However, India is not a 
signatory to either of these instruments. India also does not have a domestic law or 
policy dealing with the status of refugees on Indian soil, with there being no official 
definition of refugee despite the existence of numerous legislations regulating migrants 
such as the Passport Act, 1967, the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Foreigners Order, 1948 
(Patnaik and Siddiqui 2018, 4). Thus, recourse must be had to human rights treaties and 
customary international law. 
Article 14 of the UDHR provides that all individuals have the right to seek and 
enjoy asylum from persecution. Article 6 of the ICCPR protects the right to life whereas 
Article 7 provides for the right against torture. Article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1997 (hereinafter: 
CAT) states that no person shall be expelled, returned, or extradited to a state where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. Article 16 of the International Convention on Protection of All 
Persons Against Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) states that no person shall be, inter 
alia, returned (refouled) to a state where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance.  
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Of these, India has ratified the UDHR and the ICCPR whereas it is a signatory to 
the CAT and ICPPED. Concerning Article 14 of the UDHR, it has been argued that (i) the 
same deals with the right to enjoy asylum and not the right to be granted asylum, and 
(ii) the drafting history of the provision does not provide for a principle akin to non-
refoulement (Gautam 2019, 50). Nonetheless, Article 7 of the ICCPR has been 
interpreted as casting an implied prohibition on refoulement (Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam 2007, 209). The relevant provisions of the ICPPED and CAT also create a 
qualified duty of non-refoulement that is contingent upon the existence of substantial 
grounds for believing that the person would be subject to enforced disappearance and 
torture, respectively. It has been argued that the drafting history of the ICPPED and the 
CAT reveals that the relevant provisions thereof place reliance upon Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, 1951 and that India‟s non-signing of the same may be taken as an 
implied reservation to every non-refoulement provision in every international 
instrument after the Refugee Convention, 1951 (Gautam 2019, 50-51). However, whilst 
approaching the issue of implied reservations, it is pertinent to note that Article 23 (1) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a reservation, an express 
acceptance thereof, and an objection thereto must be formulated in writing and 
communicated to the contracting states and other States entitled to become parties to 
the treaty. 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (1969), for determining the existence of a 
rule of customary international law, the International Court of Justice stressed the 
existence of “extensive and virtually uniform” state practice coupled with “a general 
obligation that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved”, i.e. opinio juris. The principle 
of non-refoulement first appeared in an international instrument in Article 3 of the 
Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, 1933 (Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdams 2007, 202). Subsequent years witnessed the adoption of the Provisional 
Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, 1936, and the 
Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, 1938. The former 
was signed by seven states and the latter was ratified only by three states (Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdams 2007, 202). The Refugee Convention, 1951, was “a revision and 
consolidation of previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees” 
(Labman 2010, 2). Arguably, the scant ratification of the previous international 
instruments implies that non-refoulement was not a pre-existing principle of customary 
international law before 1951 and that the principle was codified and “elevated to the 
status of an obligatory norm” by the Refugee Convention, 1951 (Gautam 2019, 61). If 
this view were to be accepted, then the temporal and geographical limitations of the 
Refugee Convention, 1951 must be considered and the Refugee Protocol, 1967 may 
instead need to be viewed as the starting point of the universalization of the principle of 
non-refoulement. It is worth noting that “when a treaty-based norm stipulates a broadly 
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embraced sense of obligation and general practice among states in general (in 
particular, among non-party states), a cognate customary international legal obligation 
emerges” (Hathaway 2005, 365). In this regard, it becomes relevant that the Refugee 
Protocol, 1967 was followed by subsequent human rights instruments, i.e. the ICCPR, the 
ICPPED, the CAT, etc. embodying the principle of non-refoulement. As of February 2003, 
taking into account the Refugee Convention, 1951, the Refugee Protocol, 1967, the CAT, 
the ICCPR, and other instruments including regional conventions, 170 of the-then 189 
United Nations (UN) Member States were party to at least one or more conventions that 
embodied non-refoulement as an essential component (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 
2003, 147). Furthermore, of the remaining nineteen Member States, seven were 
members of the UN when the Declaration on Territorial Asylum was unanimously 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 14 December 1967 whereas there was found 
to be no suggestion of opposition to the principle from the other twelve Member States 
(Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, 147). The same does lend support for the existence 
of non-refoulement as a rule of customary international law.  
Scholarly opinion on the issue is still divided, with there being arguments against 
non-refoulement being considered a part of customary international law on the 
grounds, inter alia, that: (i) refoulement remains a stark reality for refugees across the 
world, (ii)  merely because “most states have accepted some kind of non-refoulement 
obligation, applying in at least some cases and contexts, it cannot concluded that there 
is a universally applicable duty of non-refoulement owed to refugees by all states, and 
(iii) the nature of duties of non-refoulement being variable, there is no basis for a 
common opinio juris (Hathaway 2005, 363-365). Regardless, a robust case can be made 
for non-refoulement constituting a norm of customary international law, and the same 
warrants scrutiny by the Supreme Court of India when considering the issue of 
deportation of Rohingya refugees.  
 
THE ROHINGYA CRISIS AND THE SUPREME COURT‟S INTERIM ORDER IN  
MOHD. SALIMULLAH 
 
A violent crackdown by Myanmar‟s army compelled hundreds of thousands of 
Rohingyas, a Muslim ethnic minority, to flee their homeland and cross the border into 
Bangladesh in 2017 (BBC 2020). Whilst the majority of Rohingyas have not made it past 
Bangladesh, there are 40,000 Rohingya refugees in India (Gibbens 2017). In response to 
the exodus, the Government of India issued an order directing state governments to 
“sensitize all the law enforcement and intelligence agencies for taking prompt steps in 
identifying the illegal immigrants and initiate the deportation processes expeditiously 
and without delay” (Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Letter to Chief 
Secretaries: Identification of illegal immigrants and monitoring thereof 2017). Mr. Kiren 
Rijiju, the Minister of State for Home Affairs stated that as far as the Indian government 
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was concerned, the Rohingyas were illegal immigrants with no basis to live in India and 
that any illegal immigrant would be deported. Furthermore, in response to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees issuing identity cards to 16,500 Rohingyas, Mr. 
Rijiju stated that whilst the government cannot stop the Rohingyas from registering, 
India was not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, 1951 (Reuters 2017). This stance of 
the Government of India prompted the filing of the writ petition in Mohd. Salimullah, 
with the principal challenge still pending adjudication (Parthasarathy 2021).  
The petitioners‟ case was that the proposed deportation would: (i) constitute a 
violation of the right to equality under Article 14 and the right to life and personal 
liberty under Article 21, read with Article 51 (c), and (ii) amount to a breach of India‟s 
obligations under international law, specifically those of the principle of non-
refoulement (Brief for the petitioners, Mohd. Salimullah 2017). The state sought to 
defend its decision on three grounds: (i) the subject matter of the petition lying primarily 
in the executive domain, (ii) the state possessing intelligence suggesting links between 
several Rohingya immigrants and terror or extremist organizations, and (iii) India not 
being a signatory to the Refugee Convention, 1951 or Refugee Protocol, 1967 (Gautam 
2019, 31-32). 
On 6 March 2021, the Jammu and Kashmir police detained around 170 Rohingyas 
in preparation for their deportation to Myanmar (Nair 2021), prompting the filing of an 
interim application on 11 March 2021 in Mohd. Salimullah (Press Trust of India 2021). 
On 8 April 2021, the Court allowed the deportation of the Rohingyas detained in Jammu 
subject to the procedure prescribed for the same being followed (Mohd. Salimullah, 
para 15).In its order, the Court, whilst considering whether Article 51 (c) of the 
Constitution of India could be invoked in case India is not a signatory to or has not 
ratified a treaty or convention, asserted that “there is no doubt that the National Courts 
can draw inspiration from International Conventions/Treaties, so long as they are not in 
conflict with the municipal law” (Mohd. Salimullah, para 12). However, concerning the 
situation in Myanmar, the Court stated that it could not “comment upon something 
happening in another country” (Mohd. Salimullah, para 12). Whilst accepting that the 
rights under Articles 14 and 21 were available to non-citizens, the Court held that right 
to not be deported fell under the ambit of the right to reside or settle in any part of the 
territory of India under Article 19 (1) (e) (Mohd. Salimullah, para 13). The Court went on 
to take note of “two serious allegations” made by the state in its reply, namely, that 
there was a threat to the internal security of the country and that agents and touts were 
engaged in the activity of providing safe passage into India to illegal immigrants owing 
to “the porous nature of the landed borders” (Mohd. Salimullah, para 14). The Court also 
noted that it had previously dismissed an application seeking similar relief in respect of 
Rohingyas detained in Assam (Mohd. Salimullah, para 14). Furthermore, the Court 
refused to allow the senior counsel representing the Special Rapporteur appointed by 
the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to make submissions by simply 
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noting that “serious objections were raised to his intervention” (Mohd. Salimullah, para 
3). Despite stating that municipal courts may draw inspiration from treaties provided 
they do not conflict with municipal law, the Court did not engage with the international 
instruments relied on by the petitioners to make a case for the existence of an 
international obligation towards non-refoulement, leaving this strand of the petitioners‟ 
argument in abeyance (Bhatia 2021). Although adjudicating contentions about non-
refoulement would necessarily require the Court to assess the state of affairs in the 
country of proposed deportation, it refused to “comment upon something happening in 
another country”, thereby rendering the very principle of non-refoulement nugatory 
(Nair 2021). By holding that the right to not be deported was subsumed within Article 19 
(1) (e), which is available only to citizens, the Court did not take into account the 
interrelationship between Articles 14, 19, and 21 (Bhatia 2021), and its jurisprudence that 
“the expression „personal liberty‟ in Article 21 covers a variety of rights, some of which 
„has been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights‟ and given additional 
protection under Article 19” (Justice K.S. Puttuswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India 2018, para 
23).  
Furthermore, the Court also failed to deal with the judgments of the Gujarat High 
Court in Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutafi v. Union of India (1999) and the Delhi High Court 
in Dongh Lian Kham v. Union of India (2016), both of which had held the principle of 
non-refoulement to be inherent with the constitutional guarantee of life and personal 
liberty under Article 21. Concerning the allegations made by the Union of India, the 
Court brought the same within the operative part of the judgment without analyzing the 
same to any extent (Bhatia, 2021). 
The Court‟s order did not satisfactorily engage with the issue of international law 
as an aid to constitutional interpretation. The Court neither surveyed nor reiterated its 
pre-existing jurisprudence in this regard. It only addressed the use of treaties that India 
may not be a signatory to as sources from which the domestic courts may draw 
inspiration. The said analysis was not taken to its logical conclusion as the order is silent 
on whether the court can read the obligation of non-refoulement as codified in the 
Refugee Convention, 1951 and the Refugee Protocol, 1967 into the fundamental rights 
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21. It abandoned its previous monist leanings by not 
engaging with the international obligations enshrined in the relevant provisions of the 
ICCPR, the CAT, and the ICPPED. Furthermore, the order did not examine the 
incorporation of norms of customary international law, and the issue of whether the 
principle of non-refoulement can reasonably be said to constitute a rule of customary 
international law; something that has been categorically contended by the petitioners 
(Brief for the petitioners, Mohd. Salimullah (2017). As such, it may be said that the order 
suffers from an inadequate engagement with international law that constitutes a 
divergence from the Court‟s trajectory in this regard.  
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The Constitution of India, despite being the longest written constitution in the 
world, provides limited guidance as to the complex relationship between international 
and municipal law. Formally, India is a dualist state that endorses transformation rather 
than an incorporation of the norms of international law. However, in a striking example 
of „creeping monism‟, the judiciary has increasingly stressed the applicability of norms of 
international law, be they conventional or customary, provided they do not conflict with 
municipal law. Gautam (2019) had suggested that Mohd. Salimullah presented several 
doctrinal and methodological questions concerning the role of international law in 
domestic constitutional adjudication.  
Unfortunately, the Court‟s interim order, in this case, falls short of these 
expectations as the Court does not fully engage with either India‟s obligations towards 
the principle of non-refoulement or its incorporation into the domestic legal framework. 
Instead, what is seen is a judgment that not only fails to address the petitioners‟ 
contentions but has the regrettable effect of negating the very principle of non-
refoulement by sending the Rohingyas back to the state of persecution.  
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